Soviet Islam by Rezun, Miron
Summer 1992 
REVIEW ESSAYS 
Atkin, Muriel. The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan. Philadelphia: 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1989. 
Critchlow, James. Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to 
Sovereignty. Boulder: Westview, 1991. 
Fierman, William, ed. Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation. 
Boulder: Westview, 1991. 
Rumer, Boris Z. Soviet Central Asia: A Tragic Experiment. Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1989. 
A growing body of literature has emerged in the past decade on a 
hitherto neglected aspect of the Soviet polity: Soviet Islam. The Soviet Union 
is no more, but the Muslim borderlands, the southern periphery of the ex-
Soviet Union, have become a major concern to Western policymakers, ana-
lysts, and scholars. This whole region, which has at least two millennia of 
history, was the cradle of Turkic civilization, moulded by a Persian heritage, 
and is now seething with political and economic turmoil. 
The Muslim periphery of the former Soviet empire is not a part of the 
"troublesome crescent" that comprises the Middle East. But the six former 
Soviet Muslim Republics — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Kirgizistan — cannot be impervious to political 
developments in the Arab Middle East. However, at the same time, these 
regions and their ultimate fate are intimately bound up with the fortunes of 
Russia in the north, and Turkey and Iran in the south. The Great Game of 
competition that had once been played out over this area by the superpowers 
has given way to regional political dynamics. 
Scholarship about this region has been dominated mainly by two 
groups of European writers. There are the French academics led by the late 
Alexandre Bennigsen and Hélène Carrère d'Encausse (now of the French 
Academy). The English specialists congregate around the "Society for Cen-
tral Asian Studies," whose inkwell produced what I call the "Indian old boys" 
coterie of writers such as Colonel Geoffrey Wheeler, Sir Olaf Caroe, and their 
latter-day proteges like Enders Wimbush and Marie Broxup. Clearly, two 
schools of thought emerged in regard to Central Asia and Azerbaijan: one 
claiming that there will be a Muslim fundamentalist revival that would sweep 
across the face of Eurasia and the Middle East and the other maintaining that 
interethnic strife will destroy the economies and the social fabric of the entire 
region. Neither the French nor the English sit on opposite ends of the fence 
here. In any one school of thought, there can be both Frenchmen (and 
Frenchwomen), Englishmen (and Englishwomen). The best among them is a 
British sociologist named David Lane, who is absolutely isolated from, or 
ostracized by, the rest. 
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The only common thread binding the others is the hackneyed thesis 
that the Soviets, and the Russians before them, have done irreparable damage 
to the Central Asian Muslims. A weaker scholarship did emerge on the North 
American continent around Kamal Karpat, later improved upon by Martha 
Brill Olcott and Mary Lubin, but laced with the old Central Asian faithfuls like 
Edward Allworth. Indeed, new breakthroughs have been made by women 
writers like Lubin, Olcott and Azade-Ayse Rorlich. In a sense, these three 
have been trailblazers who have established far more subtle patterns than their 
predecessors — and there are now many serious scholars enquiring into the 
manifold problems of this region. 
Of the four books under review, Muriel Atkin's is the worst of the lot. 
Her conclusion that "neither the disappearance of Islam nor the disappearance 
of Soviet rule in Central Asia is a likely prospect" is now too facile a 
summary, even if she did write it in 1989. If she is an expert in the study of 
this area, she should have known better. The worst part about her book is that 
she offers nothing new. Even her chapter "Will Muslims Challenge the 
USSR?" is a recapitulation of what has already been done in far greater detail 
by Alexandre Bennigsen et al. This is not a book about a political power 
struggle, which was her initial intention, but about Islamic life in Tajikistan, 
facts all too well known. She states that there has always been opposition to 
the Soviet regime, but then plunges into a rambling discussion about "folk 
Islam" and "establishment Islam," about Muslim women, Sufism, and so 
forth. Her style of writing is disjointed, fragmented, and, frankly, boring. The 
discussion of Muslim activism and influences from Iran and Afghanistan on 
Central Asia is garbled, and the conclusions very confused. In summary, it is 
the worst piece of writing on Soviet Islam that this reviewer has read since 
Rosanne Klass's Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited (1987). Like the 
latter, Atkin is so viscerally anti-Soviet that her work faithfully reproduces 
American scholarship of the 1950s and early 1960s — a Cold War treatise. 
She clearly has problems assessing the true value of Soviet sources (she likes 
calling them atheist propagandists) and uses all of these sources disingenu-
ously, reading into them things that were never said or meant and very 
selectively reinterpreting Russian-language and Tajik-language materials to 
fit schémas as in a Procrustean bed, often moralistically judging what these 
Soviet writers ought to have said. She does this with Ghafurov's History of 
the Tajiks and she thinks — she is not the only neophyte to the problems of the 
area — that Saidbaev's Islam i obshchestvo is one of the best Soviet books on 
Soviet Muslims in recent years. Worst of all is her pitiful discussion of the 
Basmachi. It is so methodologically and substantively poor as to make it 
reminiscent of past, Cold War hagiographies. But Atkin did come up with the 
best map I have ever seen of Soviet Tajikistan. 
James Critchlow's book is all that Atkin's should have been. He more 
effectively uses Uzbek and Russian-language sources than Atkin does with 
her Russian and Tajik. The reason for this is that his conceptualization is 
better, his premises are not flawed, and it is far better balanced methodologi-
cally and stylistically. 
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The author's tone is unassuming. Although studies of the Uzbek 
people have been done before, the author makes no claim to be doing a 
definitive study. The second chapter deals with the emerging nationalism in 
the republic which foreshadowed the events leading to the 1990 declaration of 
Uzbek sovereignty. He explains the patrimonial society created after Stalin 
and how the tranquility brought about by this society created the opportunity 
for nationalism. Due perhaps to the strength of native languages and Islamic 
customs, the 1960s saw derussification in language, cadres and history and the 
resurrection of the pre-Revolutionary past. This happened long before Brezhnev 
consolidated his power. Thus, a Soviet Muslim elite was created to press 
Moscow for greater autonomy. One positive feature of Critchlow's study is 
his definition of the term "elite," which is straightforward and unambiguous. 
He tells us that he likes Milovan Djilas' view of an elite class as basically one 
that wields political power. 
The author also suggests that Uzbekistan was made more open to 
outside influence from the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America during this period. The third chapter deals with the post-
Brezhnev crackdown when Uzbekistan was singled out as an example of 
wayward non-Russian nationalists. The elites were particularly targeted since 
they were at the cutting edge of Uzbek nationalism. After Brezhnev's death, 
Moscow wanted to tighten central control of cadre policy to root out "negative 
phenomena" (especially corruption) that reached intolerable proportions dur-
ing Brezhnev's era. 
Part two of Critchlow's book is titled "Uzbek Nationalism Today: 
Selected Themes" and is divided into seven chapters. In a brief introduction, 
Critchlow states that the elites also used the media to press economic and 
social issues that went straight to the ethnic sensitivities of their co-nationals. 
The first chapter deals with the cotton monoculture. He deals with the history 
of cotton in the republic and its importance in the colonialism of the central 
authorities. Moscow's drive to increase production led to terrible environ-
mental damage, loss of foodstuffs (not enough acreage was used to grow 
food), low per capita earnings (inherent in the industry), and unemployment. 
High population growth hasn't helped. The condemnation of the monoculture 
provided the elites with political and psychological weapons. The second 
chapter deals with the rape of the environment with cotton as the chief culprit 
(leading to a loss of water due to irrigation, the shrinkage of the Aral Sea, 
health problems caused by pesticides, wind erosion and deforestation). Nu-
clear contamination is also a problem especially with the nuclear dump lo-
cated outside of Tashkent. 
The fifth chapter deals with the progressive hardening of their resist-
ance to central authority. After the February 1986 Moscow Party Congress, 
where Gorbachev virtually declared war on Uzbek elites, there were a number 
of both direct and indirect examples of Uzbek resistance. Regardless of the 
central government's assertions, they failed to shake up the Uzbek party and 
government apparatus. The Uzbeks themselves were able to get rid of MVD 
General Eduard Didorenko as a symbol of alien authority. Uzbeks have thus 
rewritten some aspects of their history. 
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Critchlow's is the most up-to-date book on the Uzbeks the reviewer 
has seen, right up to the latest nationalist tremors. I also agree with his 
conclusion that historically the strong men of Central Asia tended to be 
secular, not religious. That said, the main problem with Critchlow's book is 
that, in his chapter on the Islamic factor, he provides the reader with an 
inadequate linkage between religion and national identity. There is more to 
religious influences, especially external religious influences, like Saudi Ara-
bian Wahhabism, than Moscow had made it to appear. The influence of 
Khomeini's Iran should likewise not be underestimated. Another point that 
Critchlow fails to notice is that, when there is an increasing pervasiveness of 
Islamic practices, this could translate into political action. Events in Iran and 
Afghanistan are more capable of influencing opinion among Soviet Muslims 
than the other way around, even if the former Soviet Muslims are economi-
cally more developed. Thus, Islam may transcend ethnic frontiers, the way a 
Marxist internationalist, supranational system failed to do. It is worth noting, 
however, that some analysts (Ann Sheehy for example) have pointed to a 
pervasive interethnic conflict in Muslim Central Asia and do not see Islam as 
a major force. 
I certainly think religion is a potential apocalyptic force. When the 
religious identity takes over, the elites in place risk losing control and power. 
Critchlow speaks at length about Uzbek elites; for them the problem of 
identity is a problem of power — the elite accepts the identity which best 
corresponds to its interest. Therefore, Islam can be an integrative cultural 
force, imparting a sense of cohesive identity regardless of elite-mass distinc-
tions. In short, Islam can aspire to political power. Furthermore, it is not 
beyond the realm of possibility that this area could one day be turned into a 
single Muslim federation or confederation. For instance, the Islamic Renais-
sance Party was formed in 1990 in Tajikistan. 
Critchlow also does not make a distinction between collective identity 
and ethnic identity. There is now an increasingly vocal and politically active 
Turkic element in Central Asia and one wishes to know whether this Muslim 
population will seek out a new federalist relationship with Russia or whether 
it will be a sovereign, independent player in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. 
Given the fact that the Turkic world itself is not a monolith, it becomes 
essential to any investigation to determine whether or not Russia would 
differentiate between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and how Moscow would 
perceive the nationality issue when there is interethnic conflict between Uzbek 
and Tajik or between other groups. 
Yet nationalism can be a complex phenomenon. In Central Asia it can 
be so complex as to reflect on one of the sub-identities in a given polity. So, 
the problem of nationalism may or may not be viewed as one of collective 
identity. The inference I am drawing here is that there are options with respect 
to collective identity — the Uzbek identity in particular, given its population 
and culture, has the potential to emerge as the dominant one, and given the 
right combination of circumstances. Still, the Uzbek collective identity cannot 
triumph in the political arena without being sustained by preeminent or char-
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ismatic individuals and/or some form of organization. In a word, the Uzbeks 
would need an all embracing ideology or philosophy. In the political reality 
of Uzbekistan, that would have to be Islam or something competing with 
Islam. Now that Marxism is clearly out of the picture, what else could it 
possibly be if not an Islam driven by external influences? Critchlow fails to 
address this issue. 
William Fierman's edited volume is one of the best, if not the best, 
study I have seen in a very long time. It has a stellar group of contributors and 
Fierman's own writings and analyses are first-rate. It is a pity, however, that 
Fierman chose Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone to write the foreword. Rakowska-
Harmstone, who writes in the same vein as Muriel Atkin, likes absolutely 
nothing about this real estate we call Central Asia, and dislikes Soviets, 
Russians, internationalists, and Marxists even more. 
The rest of the book, nevertheless, chronicles the "failed transforma-
tion of Central Asia." There is much here about ecological disasters, unem-
ployed youth, poverty, mismanagement, cultural and linguistic cleavages, and 
ethnic stirrings. There is anarchy here, and potential for war. 
The second section is titled "Politics" and contains two chapters. The 
first of these, "Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to 
Gorbachev" by Donald S. Carlisle, discusses the problems of center-periphery 
political relations in Central Asia. In doing so, he focuses on the history of the 
problem using specific instances and personalities beginning with the Stalinist 
era and its creation of a dual society (i.e. Russians versus natives). The second 
chapter of this section is called "Prelude to "Independence": How the Uzbek 
Party Apparatus Broke Moscow's Grip on Elite Recruitment." Written by 
James Critchlow, it is very much like his own book on Uzbekistan. 
In the next section, Ronald Wixman's "Ethnic Attitudes and Relations 
in Modern Uzbek Cities" is done especially well. It is a political culture piece 
based on interviews done in Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent during the 
summer of 1985. Wixman interviewed different ethnic groups and different 
social groups in different settings. His chapter is also based on personal 
observation. He concluded that little socializing took place across traditional 
cultural lines and that many Russians looked down on Central Asians. He 
goes on to describe instances of Russians denigrating Central Asians as 
backward. Many Central Asians were forced to learn Russian but very few 
Russians learned Central Asian languages. There was also widespread dis-
crimination and competition for positions, jobs, and housing. In his conclu-
sion, Wixman states that the Russians seemed unwilling or unable to recog-
nize and respect Central Asia's heritage. The Central Asians feel as if they are 
hosts and the Russians are poor guests who don't return their hospitality with 
proper behavior and respect. 
Azade-Ayse Rorlich's "Islam and Atheism: Dynamic Tension in 
Soviet Central Asia", deals with official and parallel Islam. She states that 
changes have made it easier for officials at all levels to promote Islam. She 
also discusses various dimensions of Islam. She also examines changes in the 
promotion of atheism and assertive Islam. The third chapter is called "Forging 
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a Soviet People: Ethnolinguistics in Central Asia" and was written by Isabelle 
Kreindler. It examines the importance of language and the imposition of the 
Russian language on Central Asians. But that is nothing new. 
The final section, "Socioeconomic Issues", consists of two chapters. 
The first one is "Women and Society in Central Asia" by Martha Brill Olcott. 
Olcott's main thesis is that Soviet rule has failed to fully integrate women into 
Central Asian life. Their primary function in this society is still to be a good 
wife and mother. Women tend to marry young and have many children. They 
have a low employment rate and minimal role in government, but have 
increased meir religious consciousness. 
William Fierman's "Central Asian Youth and Migration" deals with 
out-migration as a response to poor health conditions, poor economic condi-
tions, and unemployment. Although there is definitely an economic crunch in 
Central Asia, much of the population refuses to move away. Most natives 
believe that they would be less welcome in other areas of the country despite 
government programs to entice them to move. Rather than leave in order to 
attain a higher standard of living, Central Asians are beginning to demand that 
the government raise the standards of living in their native region. 
What the reviewer found most satisfying about this book is Fierman's 
excellent conclusion. He states that one of the central themes of the book is 
the failure of the Soviet political system to direct political and social change 
in Central Asia. To prove this, he analyzes the concept of political develop-
ment as abstracted from a theoretical study called Crises and Sequences in 
Political Development, a volume by Leonard Binder and others. The five 
areas they discuss are: penetration, identity, distribution, participation, and 
legitimacy. In the Soviet Union, Moscow's ability to penetrate society and get 
what it wanted from the people decreased since the end of the Stalinist 
political terror. Central Asians tended to have many identities, of which 
"Soviet" is only one, and not a very important one to them at that! The 
participation of Central Asians in getting language laws and other cultural 
protection laws passed slowed the center's penetration of their society. Mos-
cow's legitimacy (defined as the basis and degree to which government 
decisions are accepted by society as being correct) was, in the past, considered 
secondary to its campaign of terror against the Central Asians. Thus, after the 
end of terror, the central government's legitimacy declined. The Party re-
duced its activity to create a Soviet people and realized that the Central Asians 
will remain Muslims. The regime's legitimacy among Central Asians relies in 
part on its ability to raise living standards. Thus Gorbachev tried to improve 
participation and the economy. However, the center had to be careful, for if 
its leaders tried to improve one of the five areas, they could lose in another (for 
example, if they try to improve their legitimacy, they may lose their chances 
at penetration). Although Central Asia did supply the center with raw mate-
rials, Moscow could replace any leader, and Soviet power was successful in 
curtailing the mass manifestations of Islamic and Turkic identities. Central 
Asia's development did not proceed along the lines Moscow wished; the 
center never eliminated the cult phenomenon that linked Central Asians to one 
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another and to other Muslims, and Fierman concludes that the Soviet leaders 
had only limited success in inculcating Central Asians with a sense of "Soviet-
ness." Gorbachev, himself, first tried to rein in Central Asia. When that didn't 
work, he tried to salvage the Soviet empire by agreeing to a political system 
with less ambitious goals, with a limited degree of penetration through legiti-
macy. Moscow's failure on all of these fronts has been celebrated by Central 
Asians who feel that they have finally freed themselves of the Russian yoke. 
This conclusion throws up new ideas that deserve to be explored. That, in 
itself, makes this a book worth reading. 
One of the most striking features of the Central Asian environment is 
the potential conflict, even outright war, between Uzbeks and non-Uzbeks, 
between Central Asians and non-Central Asians. Donald Carlisle has even 
focused on cleavages and friction within the Russian Slavic community in 
Central Asia. Critchlow reminds us that, ever since the Tsarist occupation of 
the last century, authority in Central Asia has been wielded by officials sent to 
govern by the center, "first from Imperial St. Petersburg, later from Soviet 
Moscow." Now the Central Asians have to go it alone. But are they really 
capable? No one — except Hedrick Smith in his monumental The Russians — 
has even come close to analyzing the unique Orientalism (the "Aziatschina") 
that has been characteristic of the area for generations. I do not wish to 
stereotype the peoples of this region but it must somehow be said that the 
center has had more than its share of troubles and blame for failures that are 
more than just the result of poor central administration and mismanagement. 
Studies in anthropology and psychology, in addition to history and modern 
economics, will be needed in future to formulate typologies on the unique 
culture and ways of life in the region. 
Does Boris Rumer offer an answer to this? In an excellent book which 
discusses every aspect of Central Asian economics from industrialization to 
the cotton industry to problems with water, labor, and the standard of living to 
the shadow economy and organized crime to the impact of Gorbachev's 
reforms, Rumer draws on the most up-to-date (1989) Soviet sources available 
to draft his conclusions on this area's economic future. His research has 
shown that Central Asia's vast cotton, oil, gas, and precious metal resources 
have always been taken to Russia for processing. This suggests that Moscow 
has a vested interest in preserving Central Asia as a peripheral region used to 
provide raw materials for the "advanced industrial complexes of European 
Russia." By way of solution, Rumer suggests that all of the economic, 
demographic, and ecological problems of the region could be solved by a 
coordinated social-economic conception of development that is based on the 
real resources of the region and the development of labor-intensive industries. 
However, he believes that Moscow cannot or does not want to address these 
problems. His final conclusion, that the Soviet leadership refused to deal with 
these problems until a full-blown emergency made it necessary, was remark-
ably prescient. 
Miron Rezun 
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